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ABSTRACT
Can governments roll their debt over forever in dynamically efficient economies, and
thus avoid the need to raise taxes? While the answer is a clear no under certainty, it depends,
under uncertainty, on whether public debt provides intergenerational insurance. When it does
not, rollover is not possible, even if the rate of return on one-period bonds is below the
growth rate. When it does, debt rollover may be possible, even if the return on one-period
bonds is above the growth rate.
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In all major OECD countries, the average realized real rate of return on govern-
ment debt over the last 20 years has been smaller than the growth rate. Does
this imply that governments can play a Ponzi debt game, rolling over their debt
without ever increasing taxes?
If only economies were both non stochastic and in steady state, the answer to the
question would be a simple one. All interest rates would be the same, and if the
interest rate were less than the growth rate, the economy would be dynamically
inefficient. And in this case indeed, the government could issue debt and roll it
over forever, never increasing taxes, and covering interest payments by new debt
issues. Debt would grow at the interest rate, but the ratio of debt to GNP would
eventually tend to zero. And, as we also know, such a policy would in general be
Pareto improving.
Actual economies however are stochastic. And in stochastic economies, there are
many different interest rates, some which are on average above the growth rate,
some which are below. Recent research has shown in particular that economies
may well be dynamically efficient, while having an average riskiess real rate below
the growth rate. But this brings us back to our initial question. In such economies,
can't governments issue and roll over riskless debt, and thus play a Ponzi debt
game? This is the question we take up in this paper.
The paper is organized around four examples. All share the following features.
First, all characterize economies which are subject to technological shocks and
thus to uncertainty, so that assets with different risk characteristics have different
rates of return. Second, all characterize overlapping generation economies with
capital accumulation, thus economies for which capital overaccumulatiori—
dynamic inefficiency— is not ruled out a priori. But, third, in each case, we
choose, relying on a criterion derived by Zilcha [1990], underlying taste and tech-
nology parameters such the economy is actually dynamically efficient. In each of
these economies, we then ask what would happen to the debt-to-GNP ratio if the
government were to issue debt and roll it over time, issuing new debt to pay inter-
est on the existing debt. And each of the four examples gives us a very different
answer.
In our first example, the average riskless rate is negative; nevertheless the ex-
pected value of the debt-to-GNP ratio under a rollover strategy explodes and
thus the government cannot play a debt Ponzi game. In the second, the average
riskless rate is again negative, and, furthermore, the expected value of the debt-Ponzi Games 2
to-GNP ratio under rollover goes to zero. But the fact that a Ponzi game appears
viable in expected value does not imply that it is feasible. Indeed, in this example,
with strictly positive probability, debt rollover leads to an arbitrarily large value
of the debt-to-GNP ratio and is thus again infeasible. By then, the reader may
suspect that dynamic efficiency rules out Ponzi games, no matter what the be-
havior of the average riskless rate may be. But the last two examples show this
guess to be wrong. In our third example, the average riskiess rate is negative and
under a Ponzi debt game, the debt-to-GNP ratio goes to zero with certainty, so
that rollover is indeed feasible. Our fourth example offers a nearly perfect coun-
terpoint to the first; in that example the riskless rate—the rate on one-period
bonds—is positive; yet by issuing and rolling over two-period bonds, the govern-
ment can still play a Porizi debt game...
Having presented these examples, we show the simple structure underlying
these seemingly conflicting results. The overlapping generation structure of these
economies has two implications. The first is that individual saving may lead to ag-
gregage capital overaccumulation, to dynamic inefficiency. The second is that it
leads to incomplete market participation. In particular, because individuals can-
not enter insurance contracts before they are born, there may be incomplete risk
sharing. Thus, even if the economy is dynamically efficient, the allocation may
not be Pareto optimal. It is this distinction between dynamic efficiency and Pareto
optiinalicy which is crucial in understanding our results. In our first two examples,
the specification of tastes and technology leads to an allocation such that there is
no further opportunity for risk sharing, and the incompleteness of markets does
not matter. The allocation is thus not only dynamically efficient but also Pareto
optimal. This is however not the case in our last two examples, where incomplete
market participation matters. Those economies are dynamically efficient but they
are not Pareto optimal. When this is the case, government debt may provide some
insurance and thus be a partial substitute for incomplete markets. In that case,
a Ponzi game may actually be both feasible and Pareto improving. It is also not
surprising that, in that case also, the risk characteristics of the debt matter, and
this is the key to understanding our last example. In that example, two-period
debt actually provides more insurance than one-period debt, thus allowing for a
Ponzi-debt game when two-period bonds are used.
Our paper is related to a number of strands of research, from the existence of fiat
currency equilibria under uncertainty to theories of optimal debt maturity under
uncertainty. Indeed, some of our findings iust shed new light on existing results,3 Blanchard & Weil
or recast them in a different mold. We will point these relations as we go along.
1 A first example: a Diamond model with logarithmic
preferences
Our first example is a straightforward extension of the Diamond [19651 model to
uncertainty.' Consider an overlapping generation economy in which two-period
consumers inelastically supply one unit of labor when young and retire when old,
and in which population is constant and equal to one. Assume that consumers
have time- and state-additive logarithmic preferences. An individual represen-





where C,,1 and C2,t+i denote first and second period consumptions of an indi-
vidual born at t, W1 and R1 the wage and capital rental rates at t, Is the capital
stock at t, and 3 E (0, 1) measures subjective time preference.
Output is produced according to a Cobb-Douglas technology. Output at time i is
given by:
=T1Kf', (1.4)
where K denotes capital per worker at time t, and c E (0, 1) the constant share
of capital in output. The logarithm of the productivity shock T is assumed to be
independently and identically normally distributed, with mean zero and variance
2•Capitalfully depreciates in production.
1. This model is by now standard. See for example Blanchard and Fischer 119891Ponzi Games 4
1.1 Equilibrium capital accumulation and dynamic efficiency
Solving for first- and second-period consumption from utility maximization, and







Note—this will be relevant later—that, at any time t, the consumptions of the
young and the old are perfectly correlated. Our interest for the moment is how-
ever in the behavior of capital. Denote, hereafter, the logarithm of an uppercase
variable by its lowercase counterpart. We then have
k÷1 =ln[(1
—a)/3]+ a/cj + vj. (1.8)
And the behavior of output is given by
Yt =aln[(1
—a)/3]+ + Vt. (1.9)
Capital accumulation leads to serial correlation of capital and output in response
to white noise shocks. A positive technological shock increases output, saving
and thus capital and output in the following period.
Having characterized the behavior of capital, we can now ask under what pa-
rameter values this economy is dynamically efficient. This first requires defining
dynamic efficiency under uncertainty. The natural extension of the aggregative
Cass [1972] criterion is that the economy is dynamically efficient if there does
not exist another feasible sequence of capital which provides at least as much
aggregateconsumptionat all dates and in all states, and strictly higher aggregate
consumption in at least one date or state. Zilcha [1990] has recently derived a
necessary and sufficient condition for the efficiency of stationary economies such
as the one we consider. In this economy with constant population, the condition
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Interestingly, this condition does not depend on the moments of the underlying
technological shocks, and is exactly the same as that which would hold under
certainty, i.e., if T were identically equal to one. 2Inthe rest of this section, we
assume that condition (1.11) is satisfied and that the economy is dynamically
efficient. We now turn to the determination of the riskless rate.
1.2 The riskless rate
The equilibrium riskfree rate of return R(+1, required for people to hold a safe
one-period bond paying one unit of the consumption good in every state next at
+ 1 must satisfy the first-order condition for utility maximization:
(1 —9)C=/3R(1EC1, (1.12)
with consumption evaluated along the optimal path if the bond is in infinitesimal
supply.
Replacing first- and second-period consumption in (1.12) by their values from
equations (1.6) and (1.7), we get
R(1 =_i aI(1. (1.13)
which, using our distributional assumptions about v, implies
r(1 =ma +(a —1)k+1
—2/2 (1.14)
Using (1.5), (1.14) and (1.11), the unconditional mean and variance of the log-
arithm of the riskfree rate are thus given by
=ln(1+ 0) —a2/2, (1.15)
Varr(j = (1.16)
2. It is also interesting to note that the condition for dynamic efficiency of Abel et al. [1989]—
which, being a sufficient condition, is often not conclusive in particular models—is satisfied here.
Gross profits, RIC =csTIq',exceed gross investment, =3(1
—a)TtK,at all dates




Were there no uncertainty, the net riskiess rate would be equal to 0, and thus
would be positive under dynamic efficiency. But if the variance of the technolog-
ical shocks is large enough, the average gross riskless rate under uncertainty may
be less than one, and the net rate may be negative.
1.3 Debt Ponzi games
Assume that the underlying parameters are such that both the economy is dy-
namically efficient and that the average net riskiess rate is negative. Does the
average negative riskless rate imply that the government can roll its debt over
forever without ever levying taxes?
Our strategy in assessing whether or not Ponzi debt games are feasible in each of
our examples will be to characterize the behavior of debt using the interest rates
corresponding to a zero net supply of debt, thus corresponding to the case where
consumption and capital dynamics are given by (1.5) to (1.7). If we can show
that Ponzi games are not feasible under such interest rates, this will a fortiori be
true were we to do the same exercise at the interest rates corresponding to a posi-
tive supply of debt (an exercise however considerably more difficult analytically):
under our assumption on the utility function which implies that saving is a con-
stant fraction of labor income, Ponzi games and asset bubbles crowd out capital
accumulation (see Weil [1987]) and thus raise, ceterisparibus,all interest rates. If
instead we can show that Ponzi games are feasible under such interest rates, that
the debt-to-GNP ratio implodes over time under rollover, then this will remain
true if the government issues a small enough amount of debt at time 0.
Let B0 be the amount of one-period riskiess bonds issued at time 0. Then, under
a rollover strategy, the debt-to-GNP ratio at time i follows
B/ =(R{... RB0/Y, (1.18)
=[R{/(Y/Y_1)]... [R11/(Y1/Y0)](B0/Y0) (1.19)
Using the characterization of output and the riskless rate given in equations (1.9)
and (1.14), this implies:
b—y= (bo—yo)+t[ln(1—0)—u2/2] —v3. (1.20)7 Blanchard & Weil
The logarithm of the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk with drift, with
innovations equal to the technological shocks. This in turn implies that the ex-
pected value of the debt-to-GNP ratio follows:
E[B/Y]= [B0/Y0](1+ O). (1.21)
Thus, the behavior of the expected debt-to-GNP ratio is simple: it grows at rate
0, irrespective of the value of the average riskless rate.3 This implies that a Ponzi
game is not feasible: in expectation, debt becomes larger than saving, which is
proportional to GNP—an impossibility.
What is at work here is Jensen's inequality. As is clear from equation (1.14), the
riskless rate from t to t + 1 is known at time t, but varies stochastically through
time. What matters for the behavior of debt is the expectation of the product
of the riskless rates, not the product of the expected riskless rates. This is why a
negative average riskless rate is consistent with an exploding expected debt-to-
GNP ratio.4
This first example gives a clear warning. An economy may have an average neg-
ative riskless rate (or, if we were to allow for growth, an average riskless rate
below the average growth rate) but this does not imply that the government can
rollover debt forever; in this example, under the condition that the economy is
dynamically efficient, the expected debt-to-GNP ratio grows at a rate which is
necessarily positive, regardless of the riskless rate. One may ask however what
would happen if people were more risk averse than implied by logarithmic utility.
Wouldn't this further decrease the average riskless rate and reintroduce room for
a Ponzi game? We take the issue up in the next example.
2 A second example: allowing for more risk aversion
In this example, we modify the previous model in one respect: we maintain the
assumption that consumers still have logarithmic intertemporal preferences, but
3. The behavior of debt itself -as opposed to the debt-to-GNP ratio is more complex. lithe
average riskless rate is negative, expected debt initially decreases. Asymptotically however it
also grows at rate 0.
4. A similar point has been made in Galli and Giavazzi 11990) in the context of a Ramsey
economy.Ponzi Games 8
no longer restrict their coefficient of relative risk aversion to equal unity. The
rationale for adopting this more flexible specification is that, while the assump-
tion of a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution is necessary to preserve the
simplicity of the model (it makes "myopic" decision rules optimal), the ability to
choose the degree of risk aversion allows us to examine the comparative dynamic
effects of increased risk aversion on equilibrium returns and on the asymptotic
rate of growth of debt Ponzi games.
Thus, following Selden's [1978] axiomatization of OCE preferences and Weil
[19901, we assume that consumers now maximize
(1— /3) in C1, + (2.1)
where 'y > 0 (-y1) is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.5
2.1 Equilibrium capital accumulation and dynamic efficiency
Because of the assumption of logarithmic intertemporal preferences, consumers
choose to save a constant fraction /3oftheir lifetime wealth regardless of the
coefficient of relative risk aversion: attitudes towards risk do determine the cer-
tainty equivalent of the marginal productivity of capital, but are irrelevant for
consumption and savings decisions when income and substitution effects cancel
each other out. As a consequence, the equilibrium consumption allocation and
capital accumulation process are the same as in the previous section, and the
condition for dynamic efficiency is still, as in (1.1 1), 0 > 0.
2.2 The riskiess rate
While the value of does not matter for capital accumulation when intertem-
poral preferences are logarithmic, attitudes towards risk are of course a crucial
determinant of the implicit riskless interest rate. Adapting the argument in the
previous section, the equilibrium gross return on a safe claim on consumption at
t + 1 must satisfy
1 —8—R' —/3 i+1 1— ( .)
1,t -2,t+1
5.Note that [E C71]'/(1) is simply the certainty equivalent of second period consumption
for an individual with constant relative risk aversion y. One can also veri, using EHospital's
rule, that the preferences represented in (2.1) reduce to the time- and state- additive logarithmic
form in(1.1) when y—1.9 Blanchard & Weil
where the notation R(4 is adopted to highlight the dependence of the riskless
rate on 'y.
Evaluating this expression along the no debt path, one finds that:
Diii— '+h'1 —
1?-tlt+1
Under the lognormality assumption, it follows that:
—R1'1e''2 i+1 —H-i
with the expression for R11 given by (1.14).
As a consequence,
r' —'e')2 t+i — H-i
=(1+ 0) e[_(a/(i))1Z e1 . (2.5)
The effect of increased risk aversion is thus to decrease proportionately the risk-
less rate by the same factor in all states and at all dates. For a given variance of
productivity shocks, the average net riskless rate can be very negative if agents
are very risk averse.
2.3 Debt Ponzi games
Following the same logic as in the previous section, we derive the behavior of the
debt-to-GNP ratio under rollover using the processes for the riskless rate and for
output characterized above. We get that the logarithm of the debt-to-GNP ratio
at time t under Ponzi finance follows:
—= (b0—yo) +t[ln(1+ 0) + (1— 27)2/2] —Eva. (2.6)
As before, the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk with drift. However, for
a given variance of shocks, the drift may now be arbitrarily large and negative.
Equation (2.6) in turn implies:
E[B/YI= [B0/Y0](1+ 0)te(1_2t. (2.7)Ponzi Games 10
Theunconditional expected debt-to-GNP ratio thus grows (or declines...) at the
constant rate (1 + 0) e(1_1)2. Provided that agents are sufficiently risk averse,
dynamic efficiency (0 > 0) need not imply an exploding expected debt-to-GNP
ratio under rollover. Does this mean that Ponzi games are feasible in this econ-
omy? The answer is no. It is not enough that the expected value of the ratio go to
zero. What is required is that the Ponzi game be feasible in all states.6 Equation
(2.6) shows that the logarithm of the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk
with drift. It follows that the debt to GNP ratio will exceed any finite limit, such
as the ratio of saving to GNP, with probability 1 if the expected debt-to-GNP ratio
rises, and with positive probability if the expected debt to GNP ratio decreases.
Thus, with strictly positive probability, even if the expected debt to GNP ratio
goes to zero, the Ponzi game will prove infeasible.
This second example shows that, in an economy which is dynamically efficient,
the riskless rate may be negative, the debt-to-GNP ratio may go to zero in ex-
pected value under rollover, and yet there is a strictly positive probability that
the Ponzi game cannot be played forever. The proximate cause of the result is
that the debt-to-GNP ratio follows a random walk with drift. This in turn raises
another question. Could the government issue bonds with different risk charac-
teristics so that, under some conditions, the debt to GNP ratio would instead be
stationary around a mean and the probability that it reaches some critical value
be made arbitrarily small or even zero? This is the question we take up in the next
section.
3 A brief detour: contingent bonds and debt Ponzi games.
When the government rolls over riskless debt in our previous example, the debt-
to-GNP ratio follows a non-stationary process. Thus, no matter how small the
initial amount of debt issued, there is a positive probability that the ratio even-
tually exceeds some given bound. Can the government instead issue a different
type of debt, perhaps contingent debt, such that the debt process is stationary,
perhaps around some trend? With this question in mind, consider the issue by
the government of one-period bonds whose dividend is perfectly correlated with
the inverse of the marginal rate of substitution—or, equivalently in this economy,
6.Thisis indeedthe mainpointraisedby Bohn[19901.II Blanchard& Weil
with output growth. Namely, assume that a one-period bond pays
— (3 1) —TK
Assume, as in section 2, that consumers tastes exhibit a unit elasticity of substi-
tution1 and a constant coefficient of relative risk aversion 'y (the model of section
1 obtains as the special case y =1).Following the same argument as supra, the
price at time i of a one-period "output growth" bond must be, in equilibrium,
— __________________________ 3 2 Pt—
Tj E2[C2,+1/C1,]''
. ()
Using equations (1.6), (1.7), (1.5) and (3.1), it follows that
=(1 =(1+ O). (3.3)
Therefore,the (random) one-period rate of return on public debt is given by
R1 =(1+ (3.4)
Under a debt rollover strategy, given the process for the rate of return and for
output, the debt-to-GNP ratio at time t is simply
B/1 =(1+ O)t[B0/Y0]. (3.5)
Irrespective of the variance and realizations of productivity shocks, and indepen-
dently of attitudes towards risk, the debt-to-GNP ratio grows at rate 0: it thus
collapses deterministically towards zero if the economy is inefficient. This im-
plies that a necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of such a debt
Ponzi scheme is that the economy be dynamically inefficient. If the economy
is dynamically efficient to start with, so that 0 is positive, introducing debt in-
creases the equilibrium rate of return, and thus the debt-to-GNP ratio explodes
at a rate greater than 0 under Ponzi finance. If the economy is dynamically in-
efficient to start with, so that 0 is strictly less than zero, the issuance of a small
enough amount of debt still leads to implosion of the debt-to-GNP ratio so that
some Ponzi finance is indeed feasible.
At this stage, a natural guess may be that, no matter what the average riskless rate
is, and whether the expected debt-to-ONP ratio explodes or implodes, dynamic
efficiency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the feasibility of Ponzi finance.
The last two examples show this not to be the case.Ponzi Games 12
4 A third example: an economy with stochastic storage
As in our first example, assume that the economy is composed of overlapping
generations of two-period consumers, with time- and state-additive logarithmic
preferences. The technology is however different. People born at time t receive
a non-stochastic first period endowment W >0,and have access to a stochas-
tic constant returns to scale storage technology with random gross rate of return
R+1.7 The logarithm of R5 is assumed to be identically and independently dis-
tributed with mean z and variance ci2.
Usingthe Zilcha [1990] criterion, this economy is dynamically efficient if and
only ifElnRt =z￿ 0.8
Underthose assumptions, the consumption of the young, the consumption of the




Because the endowment is non stochastic, the consumption of the young and
capital accumulation are also non stochastic. Because storage is stochastic, the
consumption of the old is stochastic, and independently and identically distrib-
uted over time. In contrast to the previous examples, the consumption of young
and old are not perfectly correlated, a point to which we shall return below.
Having characterized consumption, we can derive the implicit equilibrium rate
of return on a one-period bond. From the first order conditions of the consumer,




7. This model is also standard. It was used by Koda [19841 to study the existence of far currency
equilibria, and was more recently analyzed by Gale [1990] and Blanchard 119901 in the context
of public debt. A similar model was also used by Summers 11984].
8. Formally, our example, which has constant returns to storage does not satisfy the concavity
conditions required for the Zilcha criterion to apply. An alternative formalization, which satisfies
those conditions, and has the same implications for the existence ofdebt rollover is that one where
depreciation is stochastic so that output is produced according to Y = — 6K,where 6 is a
random variable. Also, note that the inefficiency criterion of Abel et al. 11989] is inconclusive in
this economy.13 Blanchard & Weil
Thus the rate of return on one-period bonds is also non stochastic. It may well be
negative if the variance of R is sufficiently large.9 Since both the first-period en-
dowment and the riskiess rate are constant, a necessary and sufficient condition
for the feasibility of issuing at least a small quantity of debt and rolling it over is
simply
R1 < 1. (4.5)
Thus, in sharp contrast to our previous examples, in this dynamically efficient
economy, debt Ponzi games may actually be feasible. And the riskiess rate plays a
crucial role in determining the feasibility of Ponzi finance. Ponzi finance is feasible
if and only if the net riskiess rate is negative.10 This suggests that, after all, the
riskless rate may be an important variable in assessing whether Ponzi finance is
feasible or not. The last example shows that this guess would also be wrong.
5 A fourth example: serially correlated returns in storage
We consider the same storage economy, but now allow for serially correlated re-
turns on storage.11 The reason for doing this will be clear later. More specifically,
we assume that the rate of return on storage follows a geometric AR(l) process:
o —riP —
wherep E (0, 1) measures the persistence of macroeconomic shocks, and c1 E
(,) isa positive i.i.d. random variable. It follows that there exists a long run,
stable distribution of the storage rate with finite support on the interval (B, .),
whereR =fl/(1_P)and ./= 1/(1—p)
FromZilcha's criterion, taking the logarithm and the unconditional expectation
of both sides of (5,1), this economy is dynamically efficient if and only if
ElnR =ElnE￿ 0. (5.2) i—p
9. Or; if we had used the preferences of section 2, if consumers are sufficiently risk averse.
10. This result is closely related to Koda's [19841 characterization in this model of the existence
of monetary equilibria with constant money supply.
11. This example is a direct application of Gale 119901Ponzi Games 14
Again, we assume this condition to be satisfied, and consider the following debt
Porizi game. At time 0, the government issues some debt in the form of two-period
bonds, titles to one unit of good two periods later. At time 1, the government buys
back what are now one-period bonds, and pays with the proceeds of new issues
of two-period bonds, and so on. To characterize the behavior of debt under this
scheme, we must first determine the equilibrium prices of one- and two-period
bonds.
The price at time t of a two-period bond, issued at t —1and maturing at t + 1, is





Note—for later reference—that the price of a one-period bond is high when the
current rate of storage is low—because a low return on storage today creates the
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t' ID D — i_tJLt+i1Li+2)
= EC' (5.4)
Now consider the dynamic behavior of debt (or—trivially—the ratio of debt to






12. The optimal consumption profile satisfies, with logarithmic preferences, =
[(1
—)/1]R1.15 Blanchard & Weil
Can the government then use Ponzi finance? More specifically, is there a set of
parameters such that i) the economy is dynamically efficient, ii) the one-period
net riskiess rate is always positive, (iii) debt decreases every period regardless of
the realized state? As we now show, the answer is yes.
Since the rate of return on storage is bounded from above by R, a sufficient con-
dition for debt to decrease every period is, using (5.4),
<1.
The condition for dynamic efficiency is given in (5.2). And a sufficient condi-
tion for the one-period gross riskiess rate i/pit to be greater than I (and the net
riskless rate to be positive) is, simply,13 using (5.3),
(5.8)
A simple numerical example shows that inequalities (5.2), (5.7) and (5.8) can
be satisfied simultaneously. Suppose that the c's follow a two-point distribution:
=(, ) withprobability (.5, .5). Let p =.75.Then all three conditions are
satisfied.14 Ponzi finance using non-contingent two-period bonds is feasible, al-
though the economy is dynamically efficient and the one-period net riskless rate
is negative in every state.
Two notes before we return to the question of why Ponzi games are feasible in
the last two examples, not in the first two. If we had assumed that the f's had
unbounded support or that the rate of return on storage were following a random
walk (p =1),we could never make sure that debt decreased from one date to
the next whichever the realized state. For instance, with lognormal productivity
shocks, the upper bound R would be infinite, and inequality (5.7) could not be
satisfied. And if we had assumed that the shocks were i.i.d. (p =0),the two-
period Ponzi debt game strategy would be equivalent, by arbitrage, to the one-
period scheme examined in the previous section, and would be feasible if and
only if the one-period net riskless rate were negative.15
13. By arbitrage, the rates of return on one-penod bonds, and on old two-period bonds one year
to maturity must be equal. -
14.One can check that 13 =.81,and R =1.39.The left-hand side of inequality (5.2) equals
.09; that of (5.7), which provides an upper-bound on the rate of growth on the Ponzi game, equals
.92; and that of (5.8), which gives a lower bound on the gross riskless rate, equals 1.39.
15. This can be easily seen by inspection of (5.3) and (5.4).Ponzi Games 16
6Conclusion
Why do results differ between the first two and the last two examples? Under un-
certainty, overlapping generation models differ from Ramsey economies in two
ways. The first is that people have finite economic horizons. The second is that
markets are incomplete. In all four examples, the condition that dynamic effi-
ciency holds rules Out the capital overaccumulation which may arise from the
first feature. The difference between the two sets of examples comes from the
second feature. In the first two examples, incomplete markets do not matter, and
thus the economy is Pareto optimal. In the last two, they do, and debt is Pareto
improving. We consider these propositions in more detail.
In all four examples, the overlapping generation structure implies that the young
cannot enter insurance contracts with the old so as to share risk in the first period
of their life. But in the first two, the consumption of the young and the consump-
tion of the old are perfectly correlated, suggesting that there is rio room anyway
for further risk sharing. Indeed, it is easy to show that the outcome in the first two
examples is Pareto optimal. Following the previous literature,16 define a Pareto
optimal allocation in this context as an allocation which maximizes some social
welfare function, the sum of utilities of consumers for some set of weights. It is
easy to check that the decentralized allocation in our first two examples maxi-
mizes the following social welfare function
E2[(1 + O)((1 —) in +E in C2,+8+1)] (6.1)
where 0isdefined as earlier and is therefore positive under dynamic efficiency.
Thus, the economy is Pareto optimal, and there is no way to improve the welfare
of current generations without hurting some future generation. Thus the govern-
ment cannot play any Porizi game, no matter what the average riskless rate, or
the expected value of the debt-to-GNP ratio.
This is not the case in the last two examples. As we saw in the third example,
technological uncertainty falls only on the old at time 1,whilethe consumption
of the young remains constant. This suggests room for debt to provide such in-
surance, and this indeed the case. This has been emphasized by Gale [1990] who
has shown that in the context of that example, the government can not only is-
sue and rollover debt, but further issue new debt every period so as to maintain
16, See, for instance, Peled [1982], Aiyagari and Peled 119881, or Gortardi [19901.17 Blanchard & Weil
a constant debt-to-endowment ratio. Not only is such a policy feasible but it is
Pareto improving, as long as the amount of debt does not lead to a positive riskiess
rate. This can be seen easily. Carrying a constant amount of debt at a negative
riskless rate is equivalent to trarisfering a constant amount, rfromthe young to
the old. It is easy to check that the condition for such a transfer to increase ex-
pected utility is that the riskless rate be negative.17 Put another way, the reason
why the government is able to play a Ponzi game is that bonds provide insurance
and require a low rate of return. (This conclusion is similar to that in Bertoc-
chi [1991], who focuses on the equivalent phenomenom of bubbles.) The role
for non contingent debt to provide insurance may however be quite limited (or
not present at all). This explains the role of the debt in the last example. When
returns to storage are positively correlated, a low realization is associated with
a lower equilibrium riskfree rate of return next period and thus a high price of
one-period bonds. Thus, issuing two period bonds and buying them back as one-
period bonds provides insurance to the old. The price they get for their bonds
is high when the returns to storage are low. This suggests that there may be an
optimal maturity for bonds, a line that has been explored by Gale. Indeed, this
suggests the issuance of explicitly contingent bonds to provide the needed insur-
ance. And under those conditions, the government may well be able to issue and
rollover debt.
So we can return to our initial question. The average riskless rate may be a
poor guide as to whether permanent rollover of debt is feasible. It may be neg-
ative while Ponzi games are infeasible, or positive while Ponzi games are fea-
sible. The evolution of the expected debt-to-GNP ratio may be similarly mis-
leading. Whether or not governments can rollover debt in dynamically efficient
economies depends on whether the issuance of public debt can partially substi-
tute missing markets. While the overlapping structure provides a rationale for
why markets may be missing, there are many other, and perhaps more empirically
relevant reasons, including asymmetric information, why markets may be miss-
ing and why public debt may be playing a useful role.'8 In those cases also, the
government may be able to play a Ponzi game.
17. The proof is immediate and holds for a general utility function. Expected utility when an
intergenerational transfer of sizer takes place is U =Eu[W —K(r)
—r,RK(r) + r]. Straight-
forward algebra shows that dU/dr> 0 as long as R1 < 1.
18. For instance, Woodford [1986], Scheinkman and Weiss 11986] and Kocherlakota [1990]
provide examples of economies with innitely-lived agents in an unbacked at currency—
equivalent to a debt Ponzi game—may substitute for an exogenously closed market.Ponzi Games 18
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